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R ecent Cases
CRIMINAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-SHOULD
"OFFENSE" BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF
SUBSTANTIVE LAW?
State v. Moton'

Defendant Moton and another held up a service station in St. Louis
and obtained money from each of two attendants. The circuit attorney
filed two separate informations against Moton. Each charged that defendant committed first degree robbery by means of a dangerous and
deadly weapon. 2 The first information named attendant Rideout as the
alleged victim; the second named the other attendant, Cook. Defendant
was tried first for the robbery of Rideout and was convicted. Defendant
then moved to dismiss the information that named Cook as the victim,
claiming that a second trial would violate the double jeopardy clause
of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.8 The trial
court overruled this motion. Moton was tried and found guilty of the
robbery of Cook. Defendant appealed this second conviction to the Missouri Supreme
Court, asserting that the second trial constituted double
jeopardy.4
Defendant presented two arguments pertaining to double jeopardy.
First, defendant claimed that he had committed only one punishable
offense. He emphasized that the informations in the two cases alleged
almost identical acts that were motivated by a single intent and that
occurred almost simultaneously. 5 The defense cited a series of cases
arguably holding that only one punishable offense can result from a single
criminal episode, although the goods of two people are stolen. 0 In State
v. Toombs,7 the defendant issued three fraudulent stock certificates at
the same time. State v. Bockmans involved the theft of two heifers, each

belonging to a different person, from a single stock range at the same
time. The defendant stole the goods of two men from a single hotel room
at the same time in Lorton v. State.9 In each of these cases, the court
held that the particular defendant had committed only one punishable
offense. Finally, the defense also relied on State v. Citius,' 0 where the

court stated that robbing two people in "one transaction at one time
and place" constituted but one offense. 1
1. 476 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1972).
2. See §§ 560.120, .135, RSMo 1969.
3. "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb;" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. 476 S.W.2d at 786.
5. Id. at 788.
6. Id. at 789.
7. 326 Mo. 981, 34 S.W.2d 61 (1930).
8. 344 Mo. 80, 124 S.W.2d 1205 (1939).
9. 7 Mo. 55 (1841).
10. 831 Mo. 605, 56 S.W.2d 72 (1982).
11. Id. at 612, 56 S.W.2d at 74.
(528)
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The Moton court rejected defendant's first argument. Robbery in the
first degree with a dangerous and deadly weapon requires as an element
12
that the defendant places a person in fear of immediate injury. Because
the service station holdup involved two victims, the court reasoned that
3
the defendant had committed two crimes, one against each victim.'

Tombs, Bockman, and Lorton were distinguished from the present case; 14

none of the crimes charged in those cases required the physical presence
of the victim as an element. 15 Finally, the court found no robbery cases
that followed Citius and concluded that the statement in that decision
concerning double jeopardy was incorrect.' 6
Second, the defense advocated adoption of the "same transaction"
test 17 proposed by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in
Ashe v. Swenson.'3 This test requires prosecution of all offenses arising
19
from or during the same transaction or episode in a single trial. Application of this standard for double jeopardy would have barred the second
Supreme Court summarily rejected the
trial in Moton. The Missouri
"same transaction" test,2 0 noting that the majority opinion of the United
2
States Supreme Court in Ashe was not based on this standard. '
The definition of "offense" constitutes the heart of the double jeopardy
issue. Two tests have developed for defining this word. The "same evidence" test first appeared in the 18th century English case, The King v.
Vandercomb.2 2 In that case, the court stated that double jeopardy served
as a bar only if the facts alleged in the second indictment could have
23
The formalistic
convicted the defendant under the first indictment.
rules of that time did not allow the prosecution to amend pleadings to
fit a new theory when an unanticipated development occurred in the
evidence at the first trial. The English courts developed the same evidence test with this problem in mind. 24 As a result, the test allowed
reprosecution so long as the second indictment required an element
different from the first. Modem rules of criminal procedure that allow
25
amendment of pleadings to conform to proof have eliminated this need.
substantive
the
of
The same evidence test defines "offense" in terms
elements of a crime. Under this standard, offenses are not the same if
any of their elements differ. This approach analyzes whether offenses
12. § 560.120, RSMo 1969.
13. 476 S.W.2d at 790.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 789.
16. Id. at 790.
17. Id. at 788.
18. 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (concurring opinion).
19. 476 S.W.2d at 788.
20. Id. at 789.
21. 397 U.S. at 448 (concurring opinion); but see Commonwealth v. Campana,
304 A.2d 432, 441 (Pa. 1973) where the court found that the Ashe decision

merely set a minimum standard that did not govern cases in which there was

no collateral estoppel involved.
22. 169 Eng. Rep. 455 (K.B. 1796).
23. Id. at 461.
24. Caraway, Pervasive Multiple Offense Problems-A Policy Analysis, 1971
UTAH L. REv. 105, 110.
25. Mo. R. Caim. P. 26.05.
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are the same by comparing indictments or informations rather than incidents. Thus, this test defines "offense" as "punishable offense" rather
than as "criminal episode." 2 6
At the time the courts formulated the same evidence test, it was
effective in preventing successive prosecutions for a single criminal episode.27 Criminal statutes were relatively few in number and drew only
broad distinctions in classifying conduct into substantive crimes. 28 "Criminal episode" and "punishable offense" were virtually synonymous, so
use of the latter as the definition did not impair protection from succes29
sive prosecutions.
In modern times the same evidence test definition of offense as
substantive offense has allowed change in the substantive law to erode
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The number of
substantive crimes has proliferated since the inception of the standard.80
For example, such subtleties in behavior as "attempting to cast an illegal
vote" 3' and "attempting to vote illegally by impersonating a voter"8 2
are now separate offenses in the criminal statutes.3 3 As a result, the number
of substantive offenses that may arise from a single criminal episode has
greatly increased.3 4 Under the same evidence test, as the number of substantive offenses increases, the protection against multiple prosecutions
decreases.
This erosion of protection permitted by the same evidence test has
undermined the policies behind the constitutional protection against dou-

ble jeopardy. Leading authorities generally turn to the following statement by Justice Black as a statement of these policies8a
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity....36

More recently, Mr. Chief Justice Burger noted the purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause: "The prohibition is not against being twice punished,
but against being twice put in jeopardy .... ,,37
The same evidence test leaves an individual with little protection
from harassment by unnecessary multiple prosecutions.3 8 The prosecutor
26. See Comment, Double Jeopardy-Defining the Same Offense, 32 LA. L.
REv. 87, 89 (1971).
27. Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432, 435 (Pa. 1973).
28. See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 279 (1965); Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432, 435 (Pa. 1973).
29. See Comment, supra note 26; Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d
432, 436 (Pa. 1973).
30. Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432, 436 (Pa. 1973).
31. § 129A80, RSMo 1969.
32. § 129.680, RSMo 1969.
33. See Comment, supra note 26.
34. Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432, 436 (Pa. 1973).
35. Id. at 435.
36. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
37. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970), quoting from United States
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
38. Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432, 437 (Pa. 1973).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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has a great deal of discretion under this standard.39 The wide range of
overlapping substantive offenses that may arise from most criminal
incidents frees him to ignore the policies supporting the double jeopardy
concept. 4 0 For example, in State v. Ciucci41 the United States Supreme

Court, following the same evidence test, allowed three separate trials of
the defendant for murders that arose from a single incident. The prosecutor
admittedly brought each successive prosecution in order to obtain a
heavier sentence than previously imposed. 42 The result in Ciucci dearly
violates the policies behind the double jeopardy clause. Further, the same
evidence definition of offense provides a prosecutor with undue power
43
over plea bargaining and other informal aspects of the criminal system.
As Mr. Justice Brennan stated, "[G]iven our tradition of virtually unreviewable prosecutorial discretion concerning the initiation and scope of
for abuse inherent in the 'same
a criminal prosecution, the potentialities
44
evidence' test are simply intolerable."
The abuses possible under the same evidence test result in unnecessary expense and inconvenience to the public. 45 The time and resources
of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses are wasted, and court dockets are
further overloaded. 46 In some situations, of course, different substantive
offenses arising from a single criminal episode should be prosecuted at
different trials. This practice is only appropriate, however, where joinder
would substantially prejudice the prosecution or the defense by unduly
47
confusing the jury or complicating and impeding trial preparation.
48
A recent Supreme Court decision, Ashe v. Swenson, has corrected
some of the abuses possible under the same evidence test. In that case,
the Court held that the federal constitutional protection against double
jeopardy embodies the doctrine of collateral estoppel; the prosecution,
in theory, cannot retry a defendant on issues decided at a previous trial."9
Notably, collateral estoppel analysis approaches the issue more in terms
of the criminal episode rather than the criminal indictments.50 In prac39. Id. at 436.
40. See Comment, supra note 26.
41. 356 U.S. 571 (1958). In Ciucci, four separate indictments charged petitioner with murdering his wife and three children. In three successive trials
he was convicted of first degree murder. At each trial, the prosecution introduced
evidence concerning the details of all four deaths. At the first two trials, the
jury sentenced petitioner to imprisonment; at the third, the penalty was death.
Id. at 572.
42. Brief for Petitioner, app. B, at 43, State v. Ciucci, 356 U.S. 571 (1958);
see Comment, supra note 26, at 281.
43. See Caraway, supra note 24, at 127.
44. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 (1970) (concurring opinion).
45. Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432, 441 (Pa. 1973).
46. Id.
47. See Comment, supra note 26, at 292-93.
48. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).

49. Id. at 444-45; see, Mager, Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel in
Crimes Arising From the Same Transaction, 24 Mo. L. Rav. 513 (1959).

50. The Court in Ashe reasoned that because the jury at the first trial had
found that defendant did not participate in the robbery, he could not be tried
again for an offense arising from the same episode, although the second indictment named a different victim. 397 U.S. at 445-47; see Caraway, supra note 24,
at 112-19.
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tice, however, the prevalence of general verdicts in criminal trials will
make it difficult for a court to determine what issues the jury meaningfully decided. 51 Such uncertainty will reduce predictability.52 Furtier,
Ashe fails to prevent multiple prosecutions where a guilty verdict resulted
at an earlier trial.53 Thus, Ashe was a step in the right direction, but
alone is not enough. 54
In contrast to the same evidence test, many commentators have argued
that multiple prosecution and multiple punishment, although closely
related, constitute separate problems that require different treatment. 55
Accordingly, several prestigious national organizations concerned with
criminal law have urged adoption of the "same transaction" test. 0 This
standard defines "offense" in terms of the actual criminal episode. "Offense" is not divided into the artificial categories of punishable offenses
set out in the substantive law. Thus, the same transaction test does distinguish between double jeopardy offense and substantive offense. Consequently, changes in the substantive criminal law do not affect the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.57 Further, this standard
recognizes "that the consolidation in one lawsuit of all issues arising out
of a single transaction or occurrence best promotes justice, economy and
convenience."5 8
In the past year both the Pennsylvania59 and Oregon 0 Supreme
Courts held that the Double Jeopardy Clause required the same transaction test. Compulsory joinder of all offenses arising from a criminal
transaction is accomplished by legislative enactment in California, Illinois,
New York, and Minnesota. 61 The Missouri Supreme Court expressly
rejects the same transaction test in Moton. Applying the same evidence
test, the court went on to determine that defendant was not placed
51. Caraway, supra note 24, at 114; Mager, supra note 49, at 523.
52. Caraway, supra note 24, at 114; Mager, supra note 49, at 523.
53. See Caraway, supra note 24, at 113-15; Comment, supra note 26, at
283-86.
54. Commonwealth v. Campana, 804 A.2d 432, 438 (Pa. 1978).
55. See, e.g., MoDELz PENAt
L CODE § 66 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956); lUrchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YaE L.J. 513 (1949);
Note, The Protection From Multiple Trials, 11 STAN. L. REV. 735 (1959).
56. These organizations include: The American Bar Association, ABA
PRojEcr ON MImNsAMf STANDARDS FOR CRImNAL JuSmcE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 1.3 (1968); the American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL

§ 1.07 (2) (Prop. Offic. Draft, 1962); and the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, STuDY DRAFT OF A NEw FEDERAL CUMINAL
CODE § 703 (2) (1970).
57. Caraway, supra note 24, at 126-28.
58. Ashe v. Swenson, 897 U.S. 436, 454 (1970) (concurring opinion).
59. "We hold, in light of the persuasive authority discussed above, that
the Double Jeopardy Clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a 'single criminal episode'." Commonwealth v. Campana, 804 A.2d 482, 441 (Pa. 1973).
60. "[A] second prosecution is for the 'same offense' and is prohibited if
(1) the charges arise out of the same act or transaction .... " State v. Brown,
CODE

Ore. -, 497 P.2d 1191, 1198 (1972).
61. See CAr.. PENAL CODE 654 (West 1970); ILL. R.v. STAT. ch. 89, § 8-3

(1969); 40 MINN. STATs. ANN. 609.035 (1964); N.Y. CODE CRrm. Pao. § 40.20(2)
(McKinney 1971); Commonwealth v. Campana, 804 A.2d 482, 489 (Pa. 1978).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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in jeopardy twice for the same offense because a single element, the
62
person put in fear, varied between the two substantive crimes charged.
This analysis only considers the multiple punishable offense question
and thus fails to examine the true double jeopardy issue of multiple
prosecutions. The same transaction test, had it been applied, would have
allowed punishment for both substantive offenses but would have required
that they be joined in one trial.
At the time Moton was decided the Missouri Rules of Criminal
Procedure did not permit joinder of separate robbery indictments. 68
Thus, the court cannot be criticized for applying the same evidence test.
Now, however, the rules allow voluntary joinder by the prosecutor of all
offenses arising from the same transaction. 64
Joinder of all offenses arising from the same transaction should be
made compulsory in Missouri. The same transaction test should be adopted
either by decision or court rule. Adoption of this standard would restore
the protection against double jeopardy to the level intended in the Constitution and would insulate this protection from erosion by changes in
the substantive law.
FRANK M. EVANS, HI

WILLS-ELECTION BY A SURVIVING JOINT TENANT
OR TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY
In re Estate of Waters1
Henry John Waters shared a joint tenancy with his wife in real
property in San Diego, California. In 1961, he executed a self-drawn will
in which he bequeathed $60,000 to his son and devised the San Diego
property to his wife and daughter, one-half to each. He left the residue
of his estate to his widow, whom he named executrix.2 When Waters
died in 1969, the San Diego property was still held in joint tenancy. The
executrix petitioned for final distribution of the estate, proposing to
distribute the legacy to the son and the residue of the estate to herself.

The petition contained no provision for the distribution of the San
Diego property. The daughter filed objections to the proposed distribution, contending that the will required the widow to elect between her
testamentary right to the residue of the estate and her proprietary right
as surviving joint tenant3 to the whole of the San Diego property. In re62. 476 S.W.2d at 790.

63.
64.
1.
2.

Mo. R. ClUi. P. 24.04 (prior to amendment effective July 1, 1971).
Mo. R. CRmi. P. 24.04.
24 Cal. App. 3d 81, 100 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972).
Id. at 83, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
3. See C. SA=r &R. Boym, SuRvEY oF THE LAw oF PRoprLTY 18-19 (2d
ed. 1971), for a general discussion of the right of survivorship incident to a joint
tenancy which invests the surviving tenant with ownership of the whole.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/9

6

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

sponse, the executrix filed an amended petition for distribution denying
that any election was necessary, but alleging if she were required to elect,
she would waive her rights under the will and take the San Diego property.
In the latter event, the executrix contended that the residue of the estate
would pass by intestacy, one-third to her as surviving spouse, one-third to
the son, and one-third to the daughter,4 and that she was also entitled
to receive $22,554.22 as her half of a community property asset in the
probate estate.5 The Superior Court, San Diego County, held that the
widow was entitled to the residue under the will, because the title to the
joint tenancy property passed to her upon her husband's death, and no
provision in the will, either express or implied, required an election.0
Presented with a case of first impression in California, the Court of Appeal
for the Fourth District reversed, holding that the widow was required to
elect 7 and that the lower court should have accepted her waiver of the
right to the residue of the estate.8
4. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 777. Respondent's statement

as to the law of intestate succession in California is accurate. See CAL. PaoB.

221 (West 1956).
5. CAL. PROB.

CODE

CODE § 201 (West 1956) states that "(u)pon the death of either
husband or wife, one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving
spouse" while "the other half is subject to the testamentary disposition of the
decendent" In California, a wife acquires a one-half interest in all the property
accumulated from the husband's earnings during marriage; and, if the husband's
will attempts to dispose of the property thus accumulated while making some
other provision for the wife, a case for election is presented. See In re Wolfe's
Estate, 48 Cal. 2d 570, 311 P.2d 476 (1957); In re Resler's Estate, 43 Cal. 2d 726,
278 P.2d 1 (1954). Similar rules obtain in the other community property states:
Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958);
Million, Community Property:A Guide for Lawyers and Students of Forty States,
19 Mo. L. REv. 201 (1954).
6. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
7. Id. at 86, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 779; accord; Bird v. Stein, 204 F.2d 122 (5th
Cir. 1953); Young v. Biebl, 166 Ind. 357, 77 N.E. 406 (1906); Kentucky Trust Co.
v. Kessel, 464 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Thurlow v. Thurlow, 317 Mass.
126, 56 N.E.2d 902 (1944); Sutorius v. Mayor, 350 Mo. 1235, 170 S.W.2d 887
(1943); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Burrus, 230 N.C. 592, 55 S.E.2d 183 (1949 ;
Bennett v. Bennett, 70 Ohio App. 187, 24 Ohio Op. 510, 45 N.E.2d 614 (1942):
In re Riley's Estate, 6 Wis. 2d 29, 94 N.W.2d 233 (1959); Coates v. Stevens, 1
Younge &C. Ex. 66, 160 Eng. Rep. 28 (1834); see Commissioner v. Kelly's Estate,
84 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1936); Pittman v. Pittman, 237 Ark. 684, 375 S.W.2d 361
(1964); Mondelli v. Pizzi, 97 N.J. Super. 12, 234 A.2d 102 (Ch. 1967); cf. Ragland
v. Craig, 188 Tenn. 380, 219 S.W.2d 894 (1949); Johnson v. McCarty, 202 Va.
49, 115 S.E.2d 915 (1960). Contra,Colciazier v. Colclazier, 89 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1956),
Webber v. Webber, 217 Mich. 178, 185 N.W. 761 (1921); In re Estate of Grieco,
431 Pa. 108, 244 A.2d 27 (1968). With regard to some of these cases, the above
evaluation differs from that appearing at Annots., 60 A.L.R.2d 736, 733-76 (1958),
60 A.L.R2d 789, 799-800 (1958). See 5 W. PAGE, W=lzs § 47.13, at 618-19 (BoweParker revd. ed. 1962), where it is unequivocally stated:
A tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety, who devises
the whole of such real estate to someone other than the other tenant,
and then gives to such other tenant other property by will, puts such
other tenant to an election between retaining his original interest in
such real esate or accepting the benefits of the will.
8. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 86, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 779. It is unclear whether
the court's ruling includes a ratification of respondent's contention that the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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It is an established rule of law that when one possesses alternative
rights, he may choose which to take, but he cannot have both.9 One situation in which such alternative rights arise is where, as in Waters, a
testator purports to devise A's property to B and by the same instrument

gives other property to A. A has rights outside the will to the property

that testator purported to devise to B; and, alternatively, he has rights
under the will to the property that testator devised to him. In this situation, A cannot claim both his own property and the testamentary gift; he
must elect either to keep his own property and relinquish the gift, or

vice versa. 10
The obligation to elect appears from the conditional nature of the
devise. Thus, whenever the will discloses that the intention of the testator

was that one right should substitute for the other, election is required."1
Accordingly, the appellate court in Waters began its discussion by asserting
that "directly contrary to the statement made by the trial judge, what
the testator 'was thinking about' was very much before the court."'1
In Roman law, election was required in the above situation only if
the donor knew that property he purported to bequeath to B actually
belonged to A.13 As the doctrine developed at common law, however, courts

residue of testator's estate should pass by intestate succession if the widow elects
against the will. As a general rule, however, courts of equity deem it proper
that a beneficiary whose rights under the will have been defeated by an election to take against the will should receive compensation from the legacy relinquished by the legatee making the election. The application of this principle
most often results in the acceleration of remainders that were subject to a life
estate relinquished by the electing beneficiary, but it should apply with equal
effect to a residuary legacy. See Carper v. Crowl, 149 Ill. 465, 36 N.E. 1040 (1894);
Ruh's Ex'rs v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 110 S.W.2d 1097 (Ct. App. 1937); St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Kern, 346 Mo. 643, 142 S.W.2d 493 (1940); Cotton v. Fletcher,
77 N.H. 216, 90 A. 510 (1914); Bebout v. Quick, 81 Ohio St. 196, 90 N.E. 162
(1909); In re Vance's Estate, 141 Pa. 201, 21 A. 643 (1914). See also RSTATErENT
OF PROPERTY 3§ 234-35 (1936); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 291, 306 (1954); 5 W. PAGE,
supra note 7, § 47.46; J. POMiERY, EQUITY JuPisPRUtDENF. § 468 (5th ed. S. Symons

1941).
9. 5 PAGE, supra note 7, § 47.1.
10. Collins v. Fincher, 235 Ark. 587, 361 S.W.2d 86 (1962); Morrison v.
Bowman, 29 Cal. 337, 347-48 (1865); Kentucky Trust Co. v. Kessel, 464 S.W.2d
275 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Woods v. Conqueror Trust Co., 265 Mo. 511, 525, 178
S.W.2d 201, 204 (1915); Wachovia Bank &cTrust Co. v. Burrus, 230 N.C. 592,
593-94, 55 S.E.2d 183, 184 (1949). See generally 57 Am. JuR. Wills § 1526 (1948);
97 CJ.S. Wills § 1239 (1957).
11. Morrison v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 337, 347 (1865); Colclazier v. Colcdazier,
89 So. 2d 261, 264 (Fla. 1956); Lansdale v. Dearing, 351 Mo. 856, 360.61, 173
S.W.2d 25, 28 (1943); In re Riley's Estate, 6 Wis. 2d 29, 33, 94 N.W.2d 233, 235
(1959). Compare 2 J. PoMRoY, supra
note 8, § 465, with J. STORY, EQTY Julsed. W. Lyon 1918).
PRu-ENE §§ 1451-54 (14th
12. 24 Cal. App. 8d at 84, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
13. INsTrruTEs, 2.20. § 4, translated at 2 J. PoAntoY, supra note 8, § 463
at 384, states:
A testator may not only give as a legacy his own property, or that of
his heir, but also the property of others. The heir is then obliged either
to purchase and deliver it; or if it cannot be bought, to give its value ....

But when we say that a testator may give the goods of another as a
legacy, we must be understood to mean that this can only be done if

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/9
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of equity imputed to the testator the knowledge that his gift to B was inconsistent with rights of ownership possessed by A independent of the will.14
This approach was taken in one of the earliest cases in which the issue
arose: 15
A. was seised of two Acres, one in Fee, t'other in Tail; and having
two Sons, he by his Will, devises the Fee-Simple Acre to his
eldest Son, who was Issue in Tail; and he devised the Tail Acre
to his youngest Son and died: The eldest Son entered upon the
Tail Acre; whereupon the youngest Son brought his Bill in this
Court against his Brother, that he might enjoy the Tail Acre devised to him, or else have an Equivalent out of the Fee Acre; because his Father plainly designed him something. Lord Chancellor.
This Devise being design'd as a Provision for the younger Son, the
Devise of the Fee Acre to the eldest Son must be understood to
be with a tacit Condition that he shall suffer the younger Son to
enjoy quietly, or else, that the younger Son shall have an Equiva-

lent out of the Fee Acre, and decreed the same accordingly. 10

In this manner, the court ascertained the donor's intention from the dispositive scheme of the will. Thus, the rationale of the doctrine of election

appears to be that the court will give effect to the testator's intent by
implying a condition of election where none is expressed in the will.
Whether a court will imply a condition that A give up property to
which he is entitled outside the will in order to take under the will is a
question of testamentary construction. The courts presume "that no man
will attempt to dispose of another's property through the instrumentality
the deceased knew that what he bequeathed belonged to another, and
not if he were ignorant of it; since, if he had known it, he would not,
perhaps, have left such a legacy.
14. The English courts were drawn to this interpretation by the fundamental
principle of equity that a person may not both accept the benefits and repudiate
the burdens of an instrument of donation. See Ker v. Wauchope, 1 Bh. 1, 22,
4 Eng. Rep. 1, 8 (H.L. 1819); accord, Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
259 F.2d 231, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1958); In re Moore's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 265,
270-71, 216 P. 981, 983 (1925); Colvin v. Hutchison, 338 Mo. 576, 579, 92 S.W.2d
667, 668 (1936). An exception to this general rule developed at common law
to allow a widow her dower interest in addition to specific gifts devised by the
will. See 5 W. PAGE, supra note 7, § 47.5. Absent a dear manifestation on the part
of the testator that the benefits in the will were to be in lieu of dower, the
common law courts allowed the widow to retain both if her claim did not defeat
he testamentary scheme of the will. See Annots., 171 A.L.R. 649 (1947), 22
A.L.R. 437 (1923) for lists of cases supporting this view. By statute, the common
law rule was modified in many states to force an election unless the will expressly provided that the devise was in addition to dower. See, e.g., Mead v.
Phillips, 135 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Colvin v. Hutchison, supra. Section
469.140, RSMo 1949 (repealed 1955), was typical of these election statutes. See
Stevenson, Does Dower Still Lurk in Elections to Take Under the Will?, 30 U.
CiN. L. Rxv. 172 (1961), for a discussion of lingering problems in a jurisdiction
where dower has not been abolished by statute. See also UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§§ 2-201 to -207, for a suggested scheme of statutory enactments related to the
problem of election and the rights of a surviving spouse.
15. Anonymous, Gilb. Rep. 15, 25 Eng. Rep. 11 (Ch. 1708).
16. Id. at ., 25 Eng. Rep. at 11-12.
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of a will."' 7 In this respect, no election is required unless the gift to B
is irreconcilable with a property right that A has outside the will. 18 The
test is whether the property rights that the will purports to confer upon
B are so inconsistent with property rights to which A is entitled outside
the will that both sets of rights cannot stand together. 19 Its application depends upon the particular language of the will. Thus, the courts have
frequently held that a devise of property identified in general terms to B
is not so inconsistent with A's rights in specific property as to require an
election.2 0 On the other hand, the courts generally hold that a purported
disposition by specific description to B precipitates an election where A

is entitled outside the will to the specifically described property. 2 ' An

election cannot be predicated upon an ambiguous or uncertain dause of
donation, 22 because if the gift to B appears, by any reasonable interpretation, to be consistent with A's interest in the gift property, no election is
necessary.23 In Waters, the court examined the dispositive language of the
wi1l24 and concluded that the testator intended to leave a one-half interest in the San Diego property to his daughter. Since this devise was irreconcilable with the widow's right of complete ownership as surviving
joint tenant, the court endeavored to carry out the intent of the testator
by requiring the widow to elect between her proprietary right and the
testamentary gift.
25
In 1968, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In re Estate of Grieco
17. Whaley v. Quillin, 153 S.W.2d 969, 971-72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
18. Pittman v. Pittman, 237 Ark. 684, 375 S.W.2d 361 (1954); Sutorinus v.
Mayor, 350 Mo. 1235, 170 S.W.2d 387 (1943); In re Parker's Will, 273 Wis. 29,
76 N.W.2d 712 (1956). See generally 2 J. Pommoy, supra note 8, §§ 461-64.
19. Rieves v. Smith, 184 Ga. 657, 667, 192 S.E. 372, 379 (1937); Sumerel
v. Sumerel, 34 S.C. 85, 89, 12 S.E. 932, 933 (1891); In re Riley's Estate, 6 Wis. 2d
29, 34, 94 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1959); cf. Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 147, 274
S.W.2d 670, 676 (1955).
20. 5 W. PAGE, supra note 7, § 47.2; see La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15
Ariz. 200, 137 P. 426 (1914) ("all of the property of which I may die possessed");
In re Prager's Estate, 166 Cal. 450, 137 P. 37 (1913) ("all the real property owned
by me"); Shermer v. Dobbins, 176 N.C. 547, 97 S.E. 510 (1918) ("all of my real
estate"); Johnson v. McCarty, 202 Va. 49, 115 S.E.2d 915 (1960) ("my net estate").
See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 736, 754 (1958) for an additional list of cases.
21. In re Moore's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 265, 216 P. 981 (1923); Job Haines
Home v. Keene, 87 N.J. Eq. 509, 101 A. 512 (Ch. 1917); Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Burrus, 230 N.C. 592, 55 S.E.2d 183 (1949). See Annot., 60 A.L.RP2d 736,
754 (1958) for an additional list of cases supporting this view.
22. Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 240 (5th
Cir. 1958); Gulf, C. &. S.F. Ry. v. Brandenburg, 167 S.W. 170, 172 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914); Herrick v. Miller, 69 Wash. 456, 467-69, 125 P. 974, 979 (1912).
23. Pittman v. Pittman, 237 -rk. 684, 686, 375 S.W.2d 361, 362 (1964);
In re Moore's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 265, 271, 216 P. 981, 983 (1923); In re Riley's
Estate, 6 Wis. 2d 29, 34, 94 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1959); see 5 W. PAGE, supra note 7,
§ 47.13; 2 J. Poinsoy, supra note 8, § 472. Compare Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex.
138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955) with Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259
F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958).

24. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 83, 100 Cal. Rptr at 777:

I will and bequeath to my daughter, Virginia Jennings one-half ownership in the property located at 1304-38th Street, San Diego, California,
hereinafter described as Lots ONE to EIGHTEEN, Block THIRTYSIX, MARILOU PARK ....
25. 431 Pa. 108, 244 A.2d 27 (1968).
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reached a result contrary to Waters on substantially similar facts. Testator
and widow owned property as tenants by the entirety. Decedent's will gave
30 percent of this property to his brothers, and then made other gifts to
the widow. The court held that no interest passed to the brothers and
that the widow was not required to elect between the gifts conferred by
the will and her entirety interest outside the will. It supported
this result
2
with a quotation from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence:0

The doctrine of election is not applicable to cases where the
testator, erroneously thinking certain property is his own, gives
it to a donee to whom in fact it belongs, and also gives him other
property which is really the testator's own; for in such cases the
testator intends that the devisee shall have both, though he is mistaken as to his own title to one.27
The passage from Pomeroy expresses the rule in those cases where a
testator purports to give A's property to A, and not to B. In this situation A can claim both his own property and the testamentary gift.2 8 In
Grieco, however, the testator devised to his brothers a portion of the
entireties property, which in fact belonged to his widow; and the estate
given the widow under the will was less than that to which she was entitled by operation of law. The Pennsylvania court was dearly in error
in relying on the excerpt from Pomeroy.
A review of the earlier Pennsylvania cases dealing with this subject 2D
discloses that the result in Grieco rests essentially on dicta in earlier cases.
The interpretation in Pennsylvania began to develop with a collateral
issue in Alles v. Lyon, 3o where the court held that an estate by the entirety
could not be severed by divorce. The Alles court analogized that "on the
death of the husband or the wife the survivor takes no new title or estate;
he or she is in possession of the whole from its inception." 81 This language

was subsequently relied upon by another Pennsylvania court in Irlbacher's
Estate.3 2 In Irlbacher, the testator directed that "[m]y real estate . . .
should be arranged and settled according to law.. .... 83aTestator had
owned two pieces of real property in joint tenancy with his wife. She
26. 2 J. Pomn~oy, supra note 8, § 475 at 358.
27. 431 Pa. at 114, 244 A.2d at 29-30.
28. See, e.g., La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 137 P. 426 (1914);
Williams v. Williams, 170 Cal. 625, 151 P. 10 (1915); York v. Adams, 277 Ky.
577, 126 S.W.2d 1077 (Ct. App. 1939); Byrd v. Patterson, 229 N.C. 156,48
S.E.2d 45 (1948).
29. In re Peden's Estate, 409 Pa. 194, 185 A.2d 794 (1962); In re Williams'
Estate, 349 Pa. 568, 37 A.2d 584 (1944); Steinman v. Palm, 76 Pitt. Legal J. 798
(Pa. C.P. 1926); Irlbacher's Estate, 62 Pitt. Legal J. 57 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1913).
The court in Peden followed the reasoning in Williams to its logical conclusion
and held that an express conditional devise by testator of "real estate which I
hold as tenant by the entireties with my wife. .. with the intent ... of putting
my said wife . . . to her election" was void as against the law of survivorship
incident to a tenancy by the entireties. 409 Pa. at 196, 185 A.2d at 795.
30. 216 Pa. 604, 66 A. 81 (1906).
31. Id. at 606, 66 A. at 81.
32. 62 Pitt. Legal J. 57 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1913).
33. Id.
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chose to take certain bequests under the will. Testator's minor children
contended that the two pieces of realty should be brought into the estate
and distributed for their benefit, on the ground that the widow's decision to take under the will constituted an election, which terminated
the widow's rights as a surviving joint tenant. The court held that no
election was required. 4 Although it recognized that such a general disposition was too indefinite to force an election, the court also reasoned,
on the basis of the dicta in Alles, that the testator was devoid of "power to
dispose of what did not belong to him." 3 5 In the context of the doctrine
of election, this statement is misleading. As long as nothing in the will
negates a testator's belief in his power to exercise dominion over property,
the fact that he has no such power is immaterial as to his intent to require an election.38 Nevertheless, the -Pennsylvania court in Grieco followed the rationale of Alles and Irlbacher and adopted the blanket
position that the doctrine of election does not apply to any devise of en37
tireties property.
In Sutorius v. Mayor,3 s the Supreme Court of Missouri reached a
conclusion opposite to the one reached by the Pennsylvania court in
Grieco. In Sutorius, the testator and his wife were tenants by the entirety
in several parcels of land. In his will, the testator purported to devise this
land to his children, while making other provisions for his widow. At
the time the will was probated, neither the children nor the widow knew
that the property had been held by the entireties. The court held that the
will required the widow to elect, but before her conduct would constitute an election and act as an estoppel, it had to be demonstrated that
she was aware of her right to the property at the time she accepted any
benefits under the will.39 Although the court found no estoppel, it concluded that "in equity the circumstances stated required an election." 4 0

34. See Herrick v. Miller, 69 Wash. 456, 125 P. 974 (1912).
35. 62 Pitt. Legal J. at 59. The doctrine of election is not conditioned upon
the valid exercise of testamentary power. In fact, the principle applies only because
a testator attempts to dispose of property that does not belong to him. See, e.g.,
Kenucky Trust Co. v. Kessel, 464 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); see authorities
cited note 36 infra.
36. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 85-86, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 778; accord, e.g., In re Cecala's
Estate, 104 Cal. App. 2d 526, 232 P.2d 48 (1951); In re Riley's Estate, 6 Wis. 2d
29, 94 N.W.2d 233 (1959). Contra, In re Peden's Estate, 409 Pa. 194, 185 A.2d 794
(1962). See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 789, 802 (1958); 5 W. PAGE, supra note 7,
§ 47.2; 2 PoApRoy, supra note 8, § 473. The intention of the testator, not the

ground upon which that intention rests, generates the necessity of an election.
See In re Moore's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 265, 274, 216 P. 981, 985 (1923).
37. The court in In re Peden's Estate, 409 Pa. 194, 185 A.2d 794 (1962),

note 29, supra, first enunciated this position. It would seem to apply with equal
force to a devise of joint tenancy property.
38. 350 Mo. 1235, 170 S.W.2d 387 (1943).

39. Whether acts are such as to constitute an election must be determined
from the facts of each individual case, but knowledge, intent, and reliance are
the essential factors. See Collins v. Fincher, 235 Ark. 587, 361 S.W.2d 86, (1962);
Wahl v. Pate, 177 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1944); Mondelli v. Pizzi, 97 N.J. Super. 12,
234 A.2d 102 (Ch.1967). See generally 2 W. PAGE, supra note 7, § 47.21.
40. 350 Mo. at 1251, 170 S.W.2d at 396.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/9
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By analogy, a Missouri court confronted with the joint tenancy situation
would probably render an opinion consistent with that in Waters."
The question whether to require election by a beneficiary claiming a
right of survivorship in property devised by the testator to another has
been resolved by the courts of a dozen states. 42 The decisions in Arkansas, 48
47
North Carolina, 48
Indiana,44 Kentucky,45 Mississippi,46 New Jersey,
and Wisconsin 49 are consistent with the California and Missouri views;
only Florida5 o and Michigan 5l have decisions similar to the Pennsylvania
holding. The federal courts have also required election by the surviving
tenant.5 2 In this respect, the result in Waters conforms with that in the
majority of jurisdictions that have resolved the issue. Moreover, as a
41. Section 442.450, RSMo 1969, requires a grant or devise (other than to
husband and wife, executors, or trustees) to declare expressly that a transfer is
"in joint tenancy" in order to create that estate. See Powers v. Buckowitz, 347
S.W.2d 174 (Mo. En Banc 1961), for an interpretation of the sufficiency of words
necessary to create a joint tenancy under the statute. See also Eckhardt, Propery
Law in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. Rrv. 65, 70-72 (1962); Graham, Concurrent Estates in
Missouri-Sufficiency of Words Used to Create a Joint Tenancy-Section 442.450,
RSMo 1959, 27 Mo. L. Rrv. 287 (1962).
42. Courts in a few other jurisdictions have rendered decisions in cases
involving surviving joint tenants and tenants by the entirety. But it remains
unclear from these opinions whether the court has made a determination that
the doctrine of election applies as a general rule of law. See, e.g., Ragland v.
Craig, 188 Tenn. 380, 219 S.W.2d 894 (1949); Walker v. Bobbitt, 114 Tenn.
700, 88 S.W. 327 (1905). A number of decisions from other jurisdictions are also
unclear as to the nature of ownership in question and cannot be relied upon
as supporting the application of election. See, e.g., Evans v. Heilman, 37 S.D.
499, 159 N.W. 55 (1916). Additionally, several courts have considered the doctrine
in relation to a bequest of personal property held in joint tenancy, often jointly
held stock, and more recently, joint bank account funds. Most of these decisions
support the requirement of election. See Thurlow v. Thurlow, 317 Mass. 126,
56 N.E.2d 902 (1944); Bennett v. Bennett, 70 Ohio App. 187, 24 Ohio Op. 510,
45 N.E.2d 614 (1942); Grosvenor v. Durston, 25 Beav. 97, 53 Eng. Rep. 578
(R.C. 1858); Coates v. Stevens, 1 Younge & C. Ex. 66, 106 Eng. Rep. 28 1834);
915 (1960).
cf. Johnson v. McCarty, 202 Va. 49, 115 S.E.2d
43. See Pittman v. Pittman, 287 Ark. 684, 375 S.W.2d 361 (1964); Collins
v. Fincher, 235 Ark. 587, 361 S.W.2d 86 (1962).
44. See Young v. Biehl, 166 Ind. 357, 77 N.E. 406 (1906); cf. Johnson v.
Hicks, 231 Ind. 353, 108 N.E.2d 129 (1952); Ragsdale v. Robinson, 219 Ind.
335, 38 N.E.2d 570 (1942).
45. See Kentucky Trust Co. v. Kessel, 464 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971);
cf. York v. Adams, 277 Ky. 577, 126 S.W.2d 1077 (Ct. App. 1939).
46. See Bird v. Stein, 102 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Miss. 1952), rev'd 204 F.2d
122 (5th Cir. 1953).
47. See Mondelli v. Pizzi, 97 N.J. Super. 12, 234 A.2d 102 (Ch. 1967); Job
Haines Home v. Keene, 87 N.J. Eq. 509, 101 A. 512 (Ch. 1917).
48. See Wachovia Bank &cTrust Co. v. Burrus, 230 N.C. 592, 55 S.E.2d 183
(1949). But see Breece v. Breece, 270 N.C. 605, 155 S.E.2d 65 (1967); Burch v.
Sutton, 266 N.C. 333, 145 S.E.2d 849 (1966).
49. See In re Riley's Estate, 6 Wis. 2d 29, 94 N.W.2d 233 (1959); In re
Parker's Will, 273 Wis. 29, 76 N.W.2d 712 (1956); In re Schaech's Will, 252
Wis. 299, 31 N.W.2d 614 (1948).
50. See Colclazier v. Coldazier, 89 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1956).
51. See Webber v. Webber, 217 Mich. 178, 185 N.W. 761 (1921).
52. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Kelly's Estate, 84 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1986),

applying Illinois law.
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product of equity, the doctrine of election was designed to achieve just
results. In Waters, it enabled the court to effectuate a testamentary intent
that would otherwise be defeated. To this extent, the principle of election
remains both "good law and good morals." 53
RIcHARD M. WAUGH

WITNESSES-CROSS-EXAMINATION-RIGHT OF
CODEFENDANTS TO SEPARATE CROSS.EXAMINATION
Thompson v. Curators of University of Missouri1
Decedent's will designated the University of Missouri and the Slater,
Missouri, Methodist Church as residuary legatees. Three nephews of decedent, his nearest relatives, contested the will solely on the ground that
decedent laded testamentary capacity at execution. A jury sustained the
contestants' position, and both legatees appealed.
On appeal, the University of Missouri asserted individually that the
trial court had unduly restricted its right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
At the beginning of the trial, counsel for both appellants had requested
separate cross-examination. The trial judge ruled:

As indicated earlier in our conversations, I'm going to permit

you both to ask questions on voir dire; but I still feel that in
view of the fact there is just one ultimate issue and both defendants

are interested in that same one issue that cross-examination should
be confined to one lawyer or the other; of course the court will

allow you plenty of time to confer, but as I also suggested earlier,
if something arises that has some special significance to one defendant or the other, if you will request the court at that time
I'll make a ruling whether2 or not I'll allow both of you to crossexamine the same witness.
Appellant University of Missouri contended that section 491.070, RSMo
1969,3 gives each defendant the absolute right to separately cross-examine
adverse witnesses, and that the trial court's discretion is properly ex4
ercisable only with respect to the scope and extent of the cross-examination.
The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that the
53. Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1898).
1. 488 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1973).
2. Id. at 620.
3. § 491.070, RSMo 1969, provides:
A party to a cause, civil or criminal, against whom a witness has been
called and given some evidence, shall be entitled to cross-examine said
witness (except where a defendant in a criminal case is testifying in
his own behalf) on the entire case ....
4. Brief for Appellant at 54.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/9
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issue did not lend itself to the establishment of a rigid rule and was within
the broad discretion of the trial court.5
The Thompson court relied6 on the general rule that:
Where there are several codefendants, counsel of each may crossexamine plaintiff's witnesses, . . . but it is undesirable for more
than one attorney to cross-examine the same witnesses, and the
right may7 be denied where the interests of the codefendants are
identical.
Codefendants do not have an absolute right of separate cross-examination; 8
its availability depends on the trial court's view of the codefendants'
interests. Trial courts allow separate cross-examination, with respect to
any one witness, only where the codefendants' interests are adverse. 0 An
adverse interest means that the testimony of plaintiff's witness will have
a different legal effect on one defendant than on the other (s). Thus, where
5. 488 S.W.2d at 620.
6. State v. Bryant, 55 Mo. 75 (1874) is the only previous Missouri case
dealing with a codefendants right to separate cross-examination. Counsel for
one of two defendants charged with murder sought to conduct additional crossexamination on matters material to his client's defense but which were damaging
to the defense of the other defendant. The trial court refused the separate crossexamination, noting a local circuit court rule that limited cross-examination to
one counsel on each side. The trial court ruled that the questions could be asked
through the other defendant's counsel, who, of course, refused because of the
harm to his client. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, saying that "it was not in
the power of a court to adopt any rule, which would deprive a defendant in a
criminal case of the right of cross-examination." Id. at 78. The Thompson court
did not refer to Bryant in its opinion. Bryant is easily distinguished by the defendants' adverse interests, i.e., they were interested in proving different facts.
Notwithstanding this adverse interest, Bryant is authority for the proposition that
a criminal defendant has an absolute right to separate cross-examination.
7. 98 G.J.S. Witnesses § 368, at 116 (1957).
8. Only three reported cases have dealt with this issue. In Madden v.
United States, 20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927), several
defendants charged with violations of the Prohibition and Tariff Acts asserted as
error on appeal the trial court's denial of separate cross-examination. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, saying that the defendants were given a fair
opportunity for reasonable cross-examination on the record as a whole. Id. at
292.
In Kiviniemi v. Hildenbrand, 201 Wis. 619, 231 N.W. 252 (1930), plaintiff
sued a trucking company and its insurance carrier for personal injuries sustained in
a collision between his automobile and defendant's truck. The appellate court
held that the trial court had properly allowed separate cross-examination where
the defendants interests were adverse (i.e., whether there was insurance on the
car). On all other issues the trial court had properly denied separate cross-examination because the defendants' interests were identical. Id. at 624, 231 N.W. at 254.
In Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 53, 83 P.2d 311 (1938), plaintiff sued a
private property owner and the city for personal injuries. The Utah Supreme Court
held that cross-examination of the city's witness by its codefendant was proper,
noting that either or both defendants could be liable on different facts and that
each was interested in excluding itself from liability. Id. at 65-66, 83 P.2d at 316.
In Commonwealth v. Bailey, 450 Pa. 201, 299 A.2d 298 (1973) a single
defendant was denied the right to have both of his attorneys cross-examine the
same witness.
9. See note 8 supra.
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the codefendants are trying to prove different facts' o or different sides
of an issue," they have an adverse interest.
The extent to which appellate courts defer to the trial court's determination whether the codefendants have an adverse interest is unclear. This
determination is a question of law, and hence a denial of separate crossexamination where the interests are adverse could be reversible error. No
case has held, however, that separate cross-examination is a matter of
right even where the codefendants' interests are adverse. Possibly, to the
extent that the record as a whole discloses a "fair opportunity for reasonable cross-examination,"'' 2 the availability of separate cross-examination
is completely within the trial court's discretion.' 3 In any case, it is likely
that, on appeal, the codefendant (s) will have to show some prejudice from
the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine.' 4
The question of separate cross-examination of adverse witnesses also
arises in cases involving third-party defendants and interveners and in
consolidated actions. In these multiple party actions, courts have used an
approach quite different from that used in codefendant cases.
The federal courts of appeals have decided three similar cases dealing
with the right of separate cross-examination in the third-party defendant
context. 1 In each, a longshoreman was injured while working aboard
a vessel; the longshoreman sued the vessel's owner, and the owner impleaded the plaintiff's employer, a construction or stevedoring company.
The plaintiff did not charge the third-party defendant, nor did the thirdparty defendant raise any issue adverse to the plaintiff in his answer to
the third-party claim. As to the issues raised by the testimony of plaintiff's
witnesses, the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant had largely
identical interests. 16 The courts held that the third-party defendant had
10. Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 53, 83 P.2d 311 (1938).
11. Kiviniemi v. Hildenbrand, 201 Wis. 619, 231 N.W. 252 (1980).
12. The language is that used by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Madden v. United States, 20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927)
in denying separate cross-examination.
13. The trial court's decision is a two-step process: determining whether
the defendants have adverse interests, and, if so, whether those interests justify
separate cross-examination. The appellate courts in Thompson, Jensen and
Kiviniemi considered the trial courts' rulings discretionary (presumably with
respect to both steps) and spoke in terms of whether separate cross-examination
was "proper." None referred to separate cross-examination by codefendants as
a matter of right. Because the trial court was affirmed in each case, the extent
of the trial court's discretion is difficult to define.
14. The Thompson court noted that the appellants had not shown injury
or prejudice. 488 S.W.2d at 620-21.
15. Dibello v. Rederi A/B Svenska Lloyd, 371 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1967);
Hagans v. Ellerman Q Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3rd Cir. 1963); Delpit v.
Nocuba Shipping Co., 302 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 915 (1962).
The issue in Dibello was the third-party defendant's right to conduct summation.
Relying in part on the third-party defendant's right to cross-examine, established
in Hagans, the court held that the summation was proper.
16. Hagans v. Ellerman L&Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563, 586-87 (3rd Cir.
1963); Delpit v. Nocuba Shipping Co., 302 F.2d 835, 838-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 915 (1962). A codefendant is allowed separate cross-examination only
if the codefendants have adverse interests inter se in the issues that plaintiff raises.
The third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant are always adverse parties
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/9
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the right to separately cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. 17 The possibility
of individual liability was a sufficient adverse interest, as between the
two third parties, to justify the cross-examination. In one case, a contrary
ruling was reversible error.' 8 Other cases are in accord.19
A similar approach was taken in Lamborn v. Czarnikow-Rionda Go., 20
a consolidated action. Plaintiff sued to recover for breach of warranty
with respect to the quality of sugar purchased from defendant seller.
The seller sued the refining company, and the actions were joined. The
court said that justice is best served by allowing all parties to participate
with respect to the third-party claim. With respect to the third-party defendant's
right to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses, however, the question is (following
the rationale of the codefendant cases) whether they have an adverse interest
in the plaintiffs claim. To the extent that both are interested in defeating the
plaintiffs claim, they have an identical interest in the issues raised by these
witnesses. The factual evidence presented by plaintiff's witnesses may, however,
also be relevant to whose negligence caused the accident. The two parties are,
therefore, interested in establishing different facts from the testimony. Clearly,
both should have the right to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. In Hagans,
the court noted that there appeared to be some issue adversity between the
third parties regarding plaintiff's witnesses' testimony, but did not rely on this
adverse interest as the justification for the third-party defendant's right to crossexamine. Instead, the court emphasized the third-party defendant's potential
individual liability as an independent and sufficient justification. 318 F.2d at
586. In Dibello v. Rederi A/B Svenska Lloyd, 371 F.2d 559, 561 (2d Cir. 1967),
the court cited Hagans for the proposition that a third-party defendant has a
right to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. In Delpit, the court held that the thirdparty defendant has such a right based solely on his potential individual liability.
In many cases there is strict issue identity between the third parties with
respect to the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses. Hagans and Delpit are strong
precedent for the principle that the third-party defendant, nonetheless, has an
absolute right to separate cross-examination.
17. Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563, 586-87 (3rd
Cir. 1963); Delpit v. Nocuba Shipping Co., 802 F.2d 835, 838-39 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 915 (1962). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
many procedural rights of third-party defendants, including cross-examination,
have traditionally been dependent on a finding that the plaintiff and the thirdparty defendant are adverse parties; the relationship of the third parties inter se
is largely ignored. The use of similar reasoning in the codefendant context would
focus on the relationship of the codefendant and the plaintiff, instead of the
codefendants inter se, and would result in finding a right of separate crossexamination in every case.
18. Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3rd Cir. 1963).
The third-party defendant obtained a new trial on the third-party claim.
19. Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. City Chem. Corp., 290 N.Y. 64,
48 N.E.2d 262 (1943) recognized the right of an impleaded thirty-party defendant to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses in an action for breach of warranty.
In Airline Motor Coaches, Inc. v. Fields, 180 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944),
the third-party defendants' cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses was proper
because the plaintiff amended his complaint to charge the third-party defendants.
But in Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 292 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 388
F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1968) the trial court properly denied the third-party defendant
the right to cross-examine one of plaintiff's witnesses as to the contents of a statement the witness had signed, saying that with respect to such contents the interests
of the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant were identical. The
court also said, however, that the third-party defendant's liability was a question
of law.
20. 227 App. Div. 72, 237 N.Y.S. 69 (1929).
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in the cross-examination of any witness. 2 1 To hold otherwise would be to
deny the refining company the right it would have had if the actions
were separate. The court held that separate cross-examination was proper
even though the sole issue was the quality of the sugar and the seller
and the refining company had identical interests with respect to that
issue.22 The decision impliedly recognizes that liability is a sufficient
adverse interest to justify cross-examination.
The right of interveners to conduct separate cross-examination is
unclear. One case held that when it is in the intervener's interest for
the plaintiff to recover on his petition, and the intervener joins in the
plaintiff's prayer for damages, the intervener has no separate right of
cross-examination. 23 Two other cases allowed the intervener to participate
fully and separately in cross-examination. 24 In both, however, the intervener was interested in proving facts distinctly adverse to the interest
25
of the other two parties.
There is no absolute right to separate cross-examination in these
multiple party actions. 26 Courts have, however, exhibited a strong tendency
to allow it.27 The reason for this is that a party's potential liability alone
28
is usually a sufficient adverse interest to justify separate cross-examination.
21. Id. at 73-74, 237 N.Y.S. at 70-71.
22. Id.
23. Price v. King, 255 Iowa 314, 122 N.W.2d 318 (1963). An employee
sued a third party for injuries and the employer's workmen's compensation
carrier intervened. The court said that the intervener was a co-party with the
plaintiff and, therefore, had no separate rights on voir dire, examination, or
cross-examination.
24. Succession of Townsend, 40 La. 66, 3 So. 488 (1887); Salvini v. Salvini,
2 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). In Salvini, petitioner sought to be declared
the common law wife of the deceased. The state, seeking escheat, intervened.
Intervener was permitted to cross-examine petitioner's witnesses even though
the intervention petition had been dismissed. In Townsend, the state sought to
set aside the will of a woman whose husband-legatee had murdered her. The
interveners sought to be declared relatives of deceased and to prevent escheat.
The husband-legatee and the state both were interested in proving that interveners were not relatives; yet, the court allowed the state to ask leading questions
of the husband's witnesses. The state and the interveners were similarly interested
in proving that the husband could not inherit. Faced with a situation in which
the three parties had a different combination of interests on different issues,
the court allowed all to examine and cross-examine.
25. In Price v. King, 255 Iowa 314, 122 N.W.2d 318 (1963), the intervener
was not asserting a claim adverse to both plaintiff and defendant, but rather
had joined in the plaintiff's petition.
26. There probably is a right of separate cross-examination of plaintiffs
witnesses where there is pleading adversity. In Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall
S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3rd Cir. 1963), the court may have said that the right
is absolute even where the plaintiff and the third-party defendant are not
adverse on the pleadings. It is arguable, however, that in this situation Hagans
requires a finding of some issue of adversity between the third parties. See, e.g.,
Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 292 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 388
F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. Trial courts seemingly assume there are adverse interests simply because
there are multiple pleadings and parties in the lawsuit.
28. See notes 15-25 and accompanying text supra. Third-party defendants
probably have to show less prejudice on appeal from the denial of separate
cross-examination than codefendants to obtain reversal. E.g., in Hagans v. Ellerhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/9
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In the codefendant context, courts have focused solely on the relationship of the codefendants inter se and required that there be some issue
adversity before allowing separate cross-examination. 29 Yet, codefendants
interests in the outcome of the litigation, e.g., individual liability, often
are different and independent. If potential liability is a sufficient interest
to justify separate cross-examination in the multiple party cases, it should
also be in codefendant cases.
In Thompson, the University of Missouri and the Slater Methodist
Church had identical interests with respect to the issues and the outcome
of the litigation. As the court stated, the residuary legatees had a "mutuality
of purpose with the one goal of proving that decedent had a testamentary
capacity," and they "would either profit or not together.' '3 0 This conclusion is supported by both parties failure to request separate or additional
cross-examination of any witness or to show on appeal that the trial court's
ruling prejudiced either. The court's statement that the defendants' financial interests in the outcome were identical may indicate that in a case
where the defendants' liability is potentially independent, separate crossexamination would be proper.
There are several fact situations where Thompson should be inapplicable. Separate cross-examination should be a matter of right in
respondeat superior cases, 3 1 in cases where the codefendants' liability is
potentially independent,3 2 and in criminal cases.33 In the latter, in addition
to involving a more significant liability, there is a serious danger of
denying the criminal defendant his constitutional right of confrontation
if he is not permitted to cross-examine all of the state's witnesses. It has
been held, however, that the right of confrontation extends only to "areas"

man & Bucknall S.S. Co., 818 F.2d 563 (3rd Cir. 1963) the trial judge carefully
screened the testimony during the trial to insure that denial of separate crossexamination did not result in prejudice to the third-party defendant. The
appellate court said that judicial supervision is no substitute for the "sharp
instrument of cross-examination intelligently wielded by the hands of the
advocate of the party affected by testimony involving it." Id. at 587.
29. See notes 8-13 and accompanying text supra.
30. 488 S.W.2d at 620.
31. There are a great number of respondeat superior cases. The desirability
of applying Thompson in that context is therefore an important question. In
such cases, the employer's liability is independent of the employee's, making
their interests in the outcome of the litigation very different. This situation is
analagous to cases involving third-party defendants and the same principles
should apply. Thompson should not be authority for denying separate crossexamination in these cases.
32. This category includes many cases besides respondeat superior. It indudes all cases where one defendant may be liable and not the other (s).
33. Arguably, State v. Bryant, 55 Mo. 75 (1874) establishes the right of
a criminal codefendant in Missouri to separate cross-examination. The issue is
unclear because: (1) The holding in Bryant can be read as requiring issue
adversity between the codefendants; (2) the Thompson court did not mention
Bryant in its opinion, although the case was cited in appellants' brief; (3) the
case is old and no other reported cases have dealt with the issue; and (4) there
is authority elsewhere that criminal cases are governed by the same considerations
as civil cases. See, e.g., Madden v. United States, 20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927).
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of cross-examination, not to particular defendants, and that once an area
is exhausted, no further cross-examination need be permitted.3 4
Beyond being inappropriate in the above stiuations, the Thompson
rationale may be inappropriate in any case. Each defendant is, in effect,
denied his right to be represented by cousel of his choice and must
instead rely on the cross-examination of his codefendant's counsel. This
result fails to recognize the many intangibles involved in cross-examination
(e.g., the particular lawyer's skill, style, and effect on the jury). Indeed,
cross-examination of a witness by two lawyers, where not repetitious, may
increase the effectiveness of cross-examination as a truthfinding procedure.
Thus, in a case where the credibility of the witness will largely determine the result, as in Thompson,35 the codefendants should be allowed
maximum opportunity to attack the testimony.
The Thompson rationale fails to recognize the difference between
allowing separate cross-examination and the trial court's broad discretion to control the scope and extent of cross-examination. The trial court
can easily prevent repetition and delay. Full protection of the defendants'
interests is more important than what little time may be lost.3 6 As suggested herein, strong rationale exists for separate cross-examination as a
matter of right in three codefendant situations (respondent superior,
where liability is potentially independent, and in criminal cases). In
34. United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 922 (1972). In Jorgenson, several defendants were charged with conspiracy to defraud the Federal Housing Administration. On appeal, one maintained that his due process right of confrontation had been denied because the
court refused to permit his counsel to ask the prosecution's witnesses some of
the questions that other defendant's counsel had already asked. The trial court
had previously ruled that separate cross-examination was appropriate, but that
counsel were not to repeat what other defense counsel had examined on. The
appellate court said that the right of confrontation extends only to areas of
cross-examination, and that denial of the right means completely denying access
to an area that is properly the subject of cross-examination. Once an area of
cross-examination is exhausted, the right of confrontation does not require additional cross-examination by other defense counsel. The holding of the case is
that the right of confrontation does not require repetitive questions where the
questions are relevant to a precise point already covered. The difficulty lies in
determining what is repetitive, i.e., how similar must the questions be? How much
indulgence, if any, must be given counsel so that he may establish the groundwork, where somewhat repetitive, for his examination? How can the court
determine, in advance, whether the examination will be directed to a precise
point already covered? A danger in the holding is that any definition of repetitive, other than a narrow one, will effectively foreclose separate cross-examination
because separate cross-examination will often involve a degree of repetition. An
issue the court did not deal with was whether the right of confrontation requires
separate cross-examination where, though unrepetitive, the codefendants have
identical interests.
35. The sole issue in Thompson was decedent's testamentary capacity. The
lad thereof was established at trial by the testimony of several witnesses who
spolce to or observed the decedent. Probably, no one witness's testimony was
eterminative.
36. The court in Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563, 587
(3rd Cir. 1963) strongly emphasized this point.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/9
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other codefendant cases, the benefits of separate cross-examination would
seem to outweigh the minimal difficulties involved. The most satisfactory
approach may be to allow separate cross-examination in all cases.
BROOKS WOOD
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